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Articles
S. N. Verdun-Jones* Cook, Oliphant and Yntema:
The Scientific Wing of
American Legal Realism
For many years I have been asking myself the question: In what
way or ways is it possible to study law scientifically? This has,
naturally, led to an examination both into the nature of scientific
knowledge, more especially in those fields in which scientific
study has won its greatest successes- such as physics, chemistry,
astronomy- and into the possibilities of developing similar bodies
of knowledge in the field of what are commonly called the social
sciences.
W. W. Cook.'
Walter Wheeler Cook, Herman Oliphant, and Hessel Yntema
formed a distinctly homogeneous trio among the widely divergent
band of legal scholars who, whether by design or repute, constituted
the American Legal Realist movement. The three men all began
their academic careers in disciplines other than law - Cook as a
mathematician and physicist; Oliphant as a Professor of Language;
and Yntema as a Political Scientist. 2 As colleagues at Columbia
Law School, they played a crucial role in the cultivation of the
searching introspection which characterized that institution in the
second decade of the twentieth century and, although Cook left
Columbia in 1922, the other members of the trio remained to figure
prominently in the momentous discussions on curricular reform
which were undertaken by the Faculty of Law between 1926 and
*M.A. (Camb.), LLM., J.S.D. (Yale); Assistant Professor of Criminology, Simon
Fraser University. This article is based on a chapter of a J.S.D. dissertation recently
submitted to Yale Law School. The author wishes to express his thanks to
Professors Reisman and McDougal of Yale Law School, for their critical comments
on this manuscript.
1. Cook, "The possibilities of Social Study as a Science" in Essays on Research
in the Social Sciences (New York: Brookings Institution, 1931) at 27
2. From 1894-95, Cook was an Assistant in Mathematics at Columbia University;
between 1895 and 1897, he was John Tyndall Fellow in Physics pursuing his
studies in Germany (Jena, Leipzig and Berlin). Upon his return to the United States
he continued as an Assistant in Mathematics until 1900. In 1901 he was awarded
the LL.M. degree by Columbia. Oliphant was a Professor of Language at Marion
College (Indiana) for three years before he was awarded the degree of J.D. from the
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1928. 3 The period of closest co-operation between the three
scholars, however, was that between 1928 and 1933 when they
joined forces for the launching of the ill-fated Institute of Law at
Johns Hopkins.
The most tenacious bond between the trio was that forged by their
unswerving commitment to the goal of developing a scientific
approach to the study of law and legal institutions. Furthermore,
they were all firmly convinced that such a goal could only be
secured by the establishment of a "community of scholars"
dedicated to research and unconcerned with practical training for the
profession of law. As Cook put it in his famous article, Scientific
Method and the Law (1927):
The time is ripe for the establishment of such a school. Its
primary purpose would be the non-professional study of law, in
order that the function of law may be more clearly understood, its
limitations appreciated, its results evaluated and its future
development kept more nearly in touch with the complexities of
modem life . . . . the aim of the school would be not the
production of practitioners but the development of the scientific
study of law. All else would be incidental.
4
The premature demise of the Johns Hopkins Institute effectively
robbed the three men of the chance to develop the full potential of
such a "community of scholars"; nevertheless, the scientific
orientation so assiduously maintained in their jurisprudential
endeavours renders their work a formidable landmark in the growth
of modem jurisprudence.
University of Chicago in 1914. Yntema was an Instructor in Political Science at the
University of Michigan from 1917-1920.
3. See Oliphant, ed., Summary of Studies in Legal Education by the Faculty of
Law of Columbia University (1928); B. Currie, The Materials of Law Study (Pts. 1
& 11) (1951), 3 J. Legal Ed. 331, and (Pt. 111) (1955), 8 J. Legal Ed. 1; W.
Twining, Karl Llewellyn, and the Realist Movement (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1973) at ch. 3
4. (1927), 13 A.B.A.J. 303 at 309. It is interesting to note that, in Oliphant's
summary, id., it was argued that Columbia University should establish such a
research center within the Faculty of Law itself. This center together with the
"training school" would be kept "sufficiently separated to avoid the danger of
either unduly dominating or interfering with the work of the other." Id. at 23
For discussion of the work of the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law, see: S.N.
Verdun-Jones, Studies in American Legal Realism (J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law
School) at ch. V; F. K. Beutel, The Relationship of Experimental Jurisprudence to
other Schools of Jurisprudence and to Scientific Method, [1971] Wash. U.L.Q.
385 at 396-7; Some Potentialities of Experimental Jurisprudence as a New Branch
of Social Science (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1957) at 105ff.; W. E.
Rumble, American Legal Realism; Skepticism, Reform and the Judicial Process
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I. Prelude: The Genesis of the Scientific Approach.
The note of the present epoch is that so many complexities have
developed regarding material, space, time, and energy, that the
simple security of the old orthodox assumptions have vanished
. . . . The eighteenth century opened with the quiet confidence
that at last nonsense had been got rid of. To-day we are at the
opposite pole of thought. Heaven knows what seeming nonsense
may not to-morrow be demonstrated truth.
Alfred North Whitehead [1925]. 5
Natural scientists of Cook's generation experienced a revolutionary
change in the way in which they viewed the universe. By the turn of
the century, they had witnessed the disintegration of the prevailing
paradigms of physical science before the merciless onslaught of
sweeping new discoveries in the disciplines of physics, chemistry,
and astronomy. According to Cook, the discovery of non-Euclidean
geometries "led to a complete re-examination of the nature of
mathematical reasoning and its relation to formal logic" while other
developments which fanned the flame of scientific revolution were
... . the work of Darwin in showing that species and genera are
not fixed, objective entities; the discovery of vast bodies of new
knowledge in physics and chemistry, such as X-rays, radium,
radioactivity, the phenomena which led to the formulation by
Einstein and others of the theories of relativity, the development
by Planck of the quantum theory, the studies on the constitution
of the atom, the new wave mechanics...6
The inevitable result of such dramatic discoveries was a critical
change in the world view of physical science. As Thomas Kuhn has
demonstrated,
... . at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition
changes, the scientist's perception of his environment must be
re-educated - in some familiar situations he must learn to see a
new gestalt.
7
It was the cardinal thesis of Cook's writings that this "process of
re-education" must be extended to the dimly lit halls of
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1968) at 15-20. See also, The Story of the
Institute of Law (1929) prepared by "The Committee on Organization" [Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore]
5. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press Co., 1967
ed.) at 113-114
6. Supra, note I at 28-29
7. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (The International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 2, No. 2, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970 ed.) at 112
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jurisprudence; if theories about law are to have any utility
whatsoever, observers of the legal process must unequivocally
embrace the change in world view already accepted by their
counterparts in the natural sciences. In his pursuit of this goal, Cook
was wholeheartedly supported by Oliphant and Yntema.
The most noteworthy episode in Cook's campaign for a fresh start
in jurisprudential thinking was an address delivered to the Johns
Hopkins University in 1927. This address was subsequently
published as Scientific Method and the Law8 and, although the
original theme was the subject of many subsequent variations, the
work remains a basic text for the scientific wing of the realist
movement.
Cook contended that the chief component of the modem scientific
approach was a point of view which he characterized as
"relativity'':
By this is not meant the specific theories of Einstein and others,
commonly associated with that term, but a point of view which,
whatever may happen to specific doctrines, seems destined to
remain as a permanent achievement in human thought. 9
Cook suggested that there were three significant components in
the point of view described:
First and foremost, we find a frank and clear recognition of the
extent to which all our thinking is based upon underlying
postulates of which frequently we are entirely unaware but which
color all our mental processes and in particular often give for
those generalizations which we are in the habit of calling
''natural laws" the form which they assume. 10
8. (1927), 13A.B.A.J. 303
9. Id. at 306. See also the statement in a significant work published in the same
year; Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (1927):
Relativity in the general sense is the merest truism if the operational definition
of concept is accepted, for experience is described in terms of concepts, and,
since our concepts are constructed of operations, all our knowledge must
inescapably be relative to the operations selected. But knowledge is also relative
in a narrow sense, as when we saw there is no such thing as absolute rest (or
motion) or absolute size, but rest and size are relative terms. Conclusions of this
kind are involved in the specific character of the operations in terms of which
rest or size are defined. An examination of the operations by which we
determine whether a body is at rest or in motion shows that the operations are
relative operations: rest or motion is determined with respect to some other body
selected as the standard. [25-26]
Bridgman's work became a staple source for Cook's later discussions of scientific
method.
10. Supra, note 8 at 306
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Since these postulates influence the whole scientific enterprise -
from observation to theory construction - Cook urged that they be
subjected to a continuing regime of close scrutiny with a view to
ascertaining their utility in the task of understanding empirical
reality.
The second element associated with the concept of relativity is an
emphatic rejection of the whimsical notion that the universe is
explicable in terms of a few relatively simple laws of mechanics.
Cook stressed that he did not mean to argue that the classical laws of
mechanics are obsolete but rather that their utility is limited to a
certain range of worldly phenomena; beyond that range they have
no intelligible application. No doubt a major catalyst in the
acceptance of this viewpoint was the inability of traditional physics
to cope with the development of quantum theory and the subsequent
principle of indeterminacy in quantum mechanics. 11 In any event,
the developments shattered the belief that a simple mechanical
model held the key to a complete understanding of the universe.
The final element which Cook isolated in his discussion of the
concept of relativity was a healthy skepticism towards the processes
of deductive and inductive logic. With respect to the former, Cook
argued that misplaced faith in the efficacy of the syllogism as a
means of problem-solving stems from a failure to appreciate the
essential nature of the process of classification. In the wake of the
explosive discoveries of Charles Darwin, 12 scientists can no longer
avoid the significance of the fact that classifications represent not a
reflection of the objective order of nature but rather a subjective
convenience in the processing of information:
Classification thus disappears as the statement of objectively
valid and final truths about the world, and re-appears as the
adoption of working hypotheses, mental devices to which we
resort in order to deal more effectively with our experiences.
Classification is thus to be tested by its results and to be altered if
those results are not satisfactory. 1
3
When a scientist is confronted with a novel phenomenon, he
cannot deal with it on the basis that it is a new member of an already
existing class. On the contrary, he must consider whether the
11. For a contemporary assessment of the quantum theory, see Whitehead, supra,
note 5 at ch. VIII. See also Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) at 170ff.
12. See Reichenbach, id., at ch. 12
13. Supra, note 8 at 306
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differences he notes between the properties of the phenomenon and
the properties of the members of the already existing class lie within
an acceptable range of variation so that the class can be safely
expanded; alternatively, he may have to question the whole basis of
his present structure of classification and reject or modify it so as to
accommodate the information learned as a result of the new
experience. It is only after this process has been undertaken that the
scientist may frame his syllogism; consequently, Cook joins with
John Dewey in asserting that the syllogism amounts to a method of
stating the results of our thinking rather than the method of inquiry
by which these results are actually reached:
14
"Universals", general rules, "natural laws", thus appear as
working hypotheses or postulates; general ways of stating that for
a given purpose we have in the past found by experience that it
worked satisfactorily to group together a number of situations, no
two of which are exactly alike, the validity of the grouping
depending on whether it leads to desired results. 15
In the light of these observations, Cook demonstrated that
modem man must jettison the futile notion that there exist a few
fundamental and immutable principles from which can be deduced
all the other "laws of nature". Nevertheless, he was careful to
stress that deductive logic was still an immensely valuable tool in
the scientist's armoury; for example, Cook pointed out that the
pattern of future experimentation may well be dictated by deduction
in the sense that such logic is necessary to the working out of the
consequences of rival hypotheses. 16
In addition to his discussion of the limits of deductive logic, Cook
called into question the perhaps excessive reliance placed on
inductive logic since the seventeenth century. Indeed he echoed the
warning expressed by Whitehead some two years earlier:
I do not hold Induction to be in its essence the derivation of
14. Dewey, Logical Method and Law (1924), 10 Cornell L.Q. 17 at 22. Note that
Dewey (and later Cook himself) use "Logic" in a special sense: Dewey defined
logical theory as an account of the procedures followed in reaching a decision based
on intelligent inquiry. Deductive logic or the syllogism is but one of a number of
different types of logic in use.
15. Supra, note 8 at 306
16. This view was most forcefully argued by a leading contemporary philosopher
of science - Morris R. Cohen. [Later to become one of the prime critics of Cook,
Oliphant and (more particularly), Yntema]. See his discussion of the issue in: The
Place of Logic in the Law (1916), 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622; Reason and Nature (New
York, 1931) at 115-125; Law and Scientific Method in Law and the Social Order
(1933) at 184
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general laws. It is the divination of some characteristics of a
particular future from the known characteristics of a particular
past. The wider assumption of general laws holding for all
cognizable occasions appears a very unsafe addendum to attach
to this limited knowledge . . . . Inductive reasoning proceeds
from the particular occasion to the particular community of
occasions, and from the particular community to relations
between particular occasions within that community. Until we
have taken into account other scientific concepts it is impossible
to carry the discussion of induction further than this preliminary
conclusion. 
17
In other words, inductive logic must be viewed as but one (albeit
a major) tool in the scientist's pursuit of enlightenment. 18
Writing some forty years later than Cook, Hans Reichenbach has
succinctly summarized the effect of the scientific revolution which
was the subject of Scientific Method and the Law:
Gone is the ideal of a universe whose course follows strict rules,
a predetermined cosmos that unwinds itself like an unwinding
clock. Gone is the ideal of the scientist who knows the absolute
truth. The happenings of nature are like rolling dice rather than
like revolving stars; they are controlled by probability laws, not
by causality, and the scientist resembles a gambler more than a
prophet. 19
It was out of this hotbed of intellectual reorientation that the
scientific wing of legal realism was born and it is against this
background that the work of Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema must be
judged .20
II. The Establishment of Observational Standpoint.
What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also
upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught
him to see. In the absence of such training there can only be, in
William James' phrase, "a bloomin' buzzin' confusion" .
21
Neither Cook, Oliphant, nor Yntema had ever engaged in the
practice of law; hence it is scarcely surprising that they devoted
considerable attention to the crucial issue of observational
17. Supra, note 5 at 44-45
18. See Cohen, Law and Scientific Method, supra, note 16 at 190
19. Reichenbach, supra, note II at 248-49
20. Twining uses the term "scientists" to refer to that group of Columbia scholars
consisting of Oliphant, Moore, Cook, Douglas, Yntema, and Marshall; Twining,
supra, note 3 at 54
21. Kuhn, supra, note 7 at 113
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standpoint. A common theme running through their writings is the
call for a "more substantial basis of descriptive observation"; 22 in
order to attain this goal, they forcefully emphasised the need to
maintain the gulf between the enterprise of science, on the one
hand, and the normative art of the judge or the counselling and
advocacy undertaken by practising lawyers' on the other.2 3 Cook,
for example, argued-that legal phenomena may be studied from any
of at least four standpoints; that of the practising lawyer, the judge,
the legal historian, and that of the "legal investigator" who seeks to
know "not only what the officials in question have done and are
doing, but whether what they do produces the desired effects upon
human conduct."24 Typical of the group's assertion of freedom
from the "professional prejudice" is Yntema's emphatic rejection
of the narrow standpoint implicit in Holmes' prediction theory:
... . the definition of legal study as being directed to "the
prediction of the incidence of the public force through the
instrumentality of the courts", is, as it stands, perhaps
appropriate to professional legal study; but for legal science it
needs to be defined in terms of the total social situation, including
and beyond the profession. No more, for science, can the basis of
prediction be limited to the reports or even the official records.
So too, disinterest in foreign legal systems is, because life is
short, understandable in professional legal study but not in the
university of science .25
22. Yntema, The Purview of Research in the Administration of Justice (1931), 16
Ia. L. Rev. 337 at 345
23. Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction (1931),
79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 869 at 891; Yntema, The Implications of Legal Science (1933),
10 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 279 at 305-308:
.... A distinction is set up between legal science on the one hand and legal art,
legal religion, on the other, because to give to the term legal science a more
comprehensive sense is to deprive it of useful significance, because it is vital to
give legal science freedom from the limitations of professional technique and the
literary and speculative tradition of jurisprudence.[307].
See also Yntema, American Legal Realism in Retrospect (1960), 14 Vand. L. Rev.
317 at esp. 324-325, where it is argued that this drawing of a distinction between
the different viewpoints was all that was intended by the controversial divorce of
the "is" and the "ought". See also Yntema, Jurisprudence on Parade (1941), 39
Mich. L. Rev. 1154 at 1165. Oliphant's approach to observational standpoint was
largely tacit in his work [except for his advocacy of reform in legal education]. See
his Summary, supra, note 3, where the "community of scholars" approach is
championed.
24. Cook, A Scientific Approach to the Study of Law, in Essays in Honor of W. W.
Willoughby (1937) 201 at 203-204
25. Yntema, Mr. Justice Holmes' View of Legal Science (1931), 40 Yale L. J. 696
at 702-703. Note Cook's use of the theory in relation to the practitioner's
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However, the three scholars pressed the case for the establish-
ment of an impartial observational standpoint far beyond the
conventional distinction between impartial observation and profes-
sional study; they went so far as to argue that scientific
enlightenment may only be attained within the cloistered calm of the
university or some other independent research institute. Even with
respect to university research, the trio were adamant in their call for
research scholars to be insulated from the conventional activities of
the professional Law School. 26 Inevitably, this sang froid earned
the three scholars the distrust of their teaching colleagues;
27
however, they evidently believed the reasons for such an approach
were compelling.
For Yntema, the need for an institute of "pure" research was
grounded in the fear that legal scientists would be susceptible to
demands that their work be immediately relevant to practical
projects of reform. Yntema's concern was that such demands would
encourage scholars to sidestep the painstaking process of building
basic theory and method. In his view, the immediate fruits gained
by such a course of action would be more than cancelled out by the
postponement of the task of building legal science on sure
foundations:
(One) suggestion of counsel is that the purpose of the study of the
administration of justice is reform. Here again, the connotations
are vital. These are that research in the practical operation of the
law is fundamentally posited upon the desire to improve the
administration of justice by showing how its defects can be
eliminated. More crudely stated, the implication is that the
criterion of research in this field will, therefore, be the number
and importance of the specific legislative or judicial reforms
which it prepares . . . . yet a moment's reflection will suffice to
suggest that this counsel is premature as a basis of legal research.
It emphasizes the incidental; it asks research to produce
applications with or without relation to the summation of past or
possible experience; worst of all, it will require research to take a
viewpoint, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1943) at 29-30. Note the discussion of the
"professional prejudice" in Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism about Realism
(1934), 43 Yale L. J. 1240
26. See Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, supra, note 8; Yntema, Legal
Science and Reform (1934), 34 Colum. L. Rev. 207 at 207, 221-222; see also,
supra, note 22 at 343-44; Oliphant, Summary, supra, note 3 at 2 1ff.
27. Twining suggests the "aggressiveness" of Cook and Oliphant in promoting
their point of view was resented by other members of the faculty. Supra, note 3 at
45. Cook is described as having had "an abrasive character".
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premature position on proposed reform. This point of view can
give us no faith that it will reach to the roots even of the evil it
proposes to cure.
28
Cook, on the other hand, believed that provision must be made
for the pursuit of a pure science about law because the legal
investigator who approaches his task from the viewpoint of the
social engineer will never question the underlying postulates of his
discipline. As a result, legal science may be the victim of
uncorrected fallacies:
. . . . so long as we adopt in the field of legal research solely or
even mainly the point of view of the engineer, who is bent on
achieving, and that rather soon, so-called "practical results" in
the way of reform and continue to ignore what is believed to be
the more fundamental and important approach, that of "pure"
science, we shall fail to achieve the "really practical" in the field
of legal research . . . . One reason for this is not far to seek;
unless we do this, we shall almost inevitably continue to operate
with the set of postulates underlying the whole thought of the
period, postulates which may, for all we know, be misdirecting
our attention and leading us to ignore what may turn out to be the
points of attack which in the long run will lead to really valuable
''pay dirt' .29
Cook maintained that traditional jurisprudence was continuing to
operate with the postulates long since rejected by natural science. In
particular,
(1) It is relatively easy to formulate clearly expressed
propositions, i.e. propositions expressed in terms which are free
from ambiguity when applied to the external world. (2) It is
relatively easy to formulate propositions which are not only
clearly expressed but also actually do conform to experience
. . . . [and (3)] . . . . that in any given field there are a small
number of relatively simple and far reaching "principles" from
which all the more specific "rules" can be derived by logic. 3
0
By pursuing the task of observation under the heavy weight of
such out-moded postulates, legal scientists were handicapped in the
performance of all intellectual tasks; one task which was
particularly affected was the collection of "facts":
. . . . in making a 'statement of fact' about the 'given situation'
(series of events), so as to state 'what it is', I have in every case
necessarily selected certain aspects, thereby neglecting all the
28. Supra, note 22 at 346-47
29. Supra, note 24 at 219
30. Id. at215-216
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other possible aspects which I might have observed, and then
have interpreted the selected 'data' so as to bring them under
some category. . . . what our observer 'abstracts' from the
'given' will depend upon his past experience and education as
well as upon the purpose he has in view at the time. As his fund
of experience widens and also as his purpose changes he will
select different combinations of aspects and relate them in
different ways.
31
It is interesting to note that while the group were most concerned
with the type of 'pure' research which was intended for the Johns
Hopkins Institute, they nevertheless were keen to alter the
observational standpoint of law students in the professional
schools. 32 At the heart of the program was a call for the entire
reorganization of the traditional law curriculum on functional lines.
Oliphant argued that the present structure of courses was out of
touch with 'real life' and that this deficiency coupled with the
intellectual handicap imposed by subservience to an out-moded
conceptual apparatus caused students to degenerate into "intellec-
tual infants with toothless gums too soft except for munching elastic
generalities with sophomorphic serenity". 33 Oliphant, and to a
lesser extent Yntema, played a crucial role in the attempt to achieve
such a far-reaching re-organization at Columbia. For various
reasons, the assault on the citadel was only very partially
successful, with both Oliphant and Yntema moving to Johns
Hopkins in 1928.3
4
III. The Conception of Science
At the present time the enemies of the scientific attitude are
31. Cook, 'Facts' and 'Statements of fact' (1937), 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 233 at
238-39. See also Oliphant, Facts, Opinions and Value-Judgments (1932), 10 Tex.
L. Rev. 127 at 132-34. It is interesting to note that neither Cook, Oliphant, nor
Yntema discussed methods of combatting personal prejudice by means of
self-analysis etc. Such prejudice is only mentioned tangentially, e.g., Yntema, The
Implications of Legal Science, supra, note 23 at 284n.
32. See, e.g., Cook's course upon Legal Method and Analysis at Yale Law
School; discussed in Modern Movements in Legal Education (1929), 6 Am. L. Sch.
Rev. 402 at 409ff.
33. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928), 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 215 at 224;
The Future of Legal Education (1929), 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 329; Summary, supra,
note 3
34. See generally Currie, supra, note 3 at Part III passim; Twining, supra, note 3
at ch. 3. One of the few permanent successes was the work of Oliphant in
developing a reorganized course on trade regulation. This was begun in 1923 and
was based on his casebook, Cases on Trade Regulation (1923).
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numerous and organized . . . In particular, science is not
welcomed but rather opposed when it "invades" . . . the field




Significantly, neither Cook, Oliphant, nor Yntema were affected by
the institutional approach which had been so crucial in the
development of many of their realist colleagues;36 on the contrary,
their conception of science was shaped by the austere model of the
natural sciences.3 7 Cook's background in mathematics and physics
enabled him to mediate between these disciplines and jurisprudence
with unique authority.
As we have seen, his major contribution lies in his detailed
exposition of the structure of scientific thinking as it emerged from
the revolution in world view experienced at the turn of the century.
His treatment of this topic was by no means original; it was
essentially a succinct synthesis of the works of such philosophers of
science as Bridgman, Pearson, Ritchie, Bertrand Russell, and
Whitehead.38 Furthermore, the vital bridgehead between such
metascience and Cook's approach towards scientific thinking about
law was constructed almost exclusively upon the philosophy of John
Dewey. 3 9
Central to Cook's conception of science was Dewey's thesis that
"the same logic of inquiry used in physics and chemistry will yield
useful results if applied in all fields in which intelligent inquiry can
be carried on". 40 This fundamental precept became the rallying
35. Dewey, Unity of Science as a Social Problem (International Encyclopedia of
Unified Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938) at 33
36. The effect of the institutional approach is clearly visible in the work of Arnold,
Llewellyn, Moore, Hamilton, and Douglas.
37. For brief summaries of their approach, see H. G. Reuschlein,
Jurisprudence-Its American Prophets (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1951) at
230-33 and 275-287
38. Some of the major sources of Cook's approach are acknowledged in Modern
Movements in Legal Education, supra, note 32 at 410
39. Cook's recognition of his debt to Dewey is clearly presented in his contribution
in Kocourek, ed., My Philosophy of Law (Boston: Boston Law Book Co., 1941) at
51-66. See also The Possibilities of Social Study as a Science, supra, note I at 32
and A Scientific Approach to the Study of Law, supra, note 24. It appears that
Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct, (1922) exercised a particular influence on
Cook's development.
40. My Philosophy of Law, id. at 32-52. See Dewey, supra, note 35 at 29-30:
.... the scientific method is not confined to those who are called scientists.
The body of knowledge and ideas which is the product of the work of the latter
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point for a significant group of scientists who participated in what
became known as the unity of science movement. The dominant
approach in this movement was characterized by Charles Morris as
"scientific empiricism." 41 Under the umbrella of this approach
mathematics and 'logic' on the one hand, and "experimentation",
on the other, united together in a single method of obtaining
knowledge about nature:
The important result was a double shift from a metaphysical to a
methodological rationalism, and from a loose-joined empiricism
to an empiricism which utilized the techniques and the form of
mathematics. Rationalism and empiricism in this way ceased to
be rival methods for knowing nature and became complementary
components of experimental science with its one observational-
hypothetical-deductive-experimental method . . . . the emphasis
upon experimentation as against mere observation meant the
breakdown of the radical opposition of theory and practice, for
not only is experimentation itself a kind of practice, but it is of
such a kind as to open up the possibility of a novel and systematic
control of many kinds of natural processes.
4 2
In Morris' view, this rapprochement of the two rival methods of
obtaining knowledge was sealed by the development of prag-
matism. The peculiar function of the pragmatic approach in this
context was "to make explicit the instrumental significance of ideas
in general and of scientific results and procedure in particular" 
3
Naturally, John Dewey was a major protagonist in this process and
his work was a vital stimulus to the unity of science movement and
its project of establishing an International Encyclopedia of Unified
Science.
44
Unfortunately, while Cook rendered a lucid account of the basis
of scientific empiricism he failed to progress from the ethereal
is the fruit of a method which is followed by the wider body of persons who deal
intelligently and openly with the objects and energies of the common
environment.
41. Charles E. Morris, Scientific Empiricism (International Encyclopedia of
Unified Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, Chicago, 1938) at 63-75. Cook points out that the
approach has also been labelled pragmatism, instrumentalism, operationalism,
logical positivism, and the functional approach: My Philosophy of Law, supra, note
39 at 56
42. Morris, id. at 64
43. Id. at 67
44. The original conception of the Encyclopedia was that of Professor Otto
Neurath. However, his death and the advent of world war II prevented the project
from advancing beyond the publication of but one volume - The Foundations of
the Unity of Science.
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realms of metascience to the more exacting task of developing
specific methods of research for the study of legal institutions. It is
true that there were pious calls for the establishment of specific
experiments in the programme of the Johns Hopkins Institute of
Law,4 5 but such statements were mere declarations of faith rather
than a genuine attempt to harness the natural science model to the
service of jurisprudence. Ironically, Cook's only sustained use of
scientific empiricism was in the traditional jurisprudential area of
the analysis of judicial opinions and even here he was more
concerned with the destruction of traditional modes of thought than
with the task of constructing alternative bases for juristic science.
Furthermore, although Cook repeatedly asserted that scientific
empiricism was a suitable foundation for scientific inquiry about
law, his work is completely devoid of any attempt to construct
theory of even the most rudimentary nature. While lauding the
virtues of the experimental approach he inexplicably confined his
efforts to the peaceful domain of appellate case-law. A parallel tale
of lost opportunities is manifested by Cook's mysterious reluctance
to utilize the resources of the Institute of Law for the advancement
of the programme outlined in Scientific Method and the Law.
Standing in marked contrast with his mentor's abstract approach
to scientific knowledge was Hessel Yntema's avowedly practical
conception of science. In his view,
As process, science is verification; as product, science consists of
truth, the statement of what is observed. To verify is to show
consistency; in the first instance, of a statement with the
experience it denotes; in the second instance, with analagous
statements of experience . . . . Thus, whether regarded as
process or as product, science principally denotes two things -
accuracy and economy in the formulation of information.
Accuracy involves emphasis upon detail, the development of
standards of measurement, of techniques and instruments of
controlled observation; economy imports the invention of
type-symbols, of formulae, and the selection of the mode of
representation which best enables the human mind to com-
prehend and utilize the multitudes of detail. In sum, the hall-mark
of scientific study is that it looks to the formulation of experience
or, conversely stated to the experimental verification of theory.
Scientific truth is neither inchoate raw fact nor suppositious
hypothesis, but knowledge which is true because its accuracy and
45. See Johns Hopkins University Circular: The Institute for the Study of Law
(1929-30), at 20-21 (Statement by the Faculty)
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economy has been verified both in theory and in fact. 46
Yntema argued that the scientific verification of theories about
the legal process may be attempted either by observation under
experimentally controlled conditions or by the observation and
correlation of multiple phenomena under varying conditions.
However, since the opportunities for controlled experiments in this
area are of necessity severely limited, he suggested that the future of
legal science lay in the undertaking of comparative and statistical
studies; significantly, the programme of the Johns Hopkins Institute
was devised on the basis of this fundamental postulate.
47
Yntema was convinced that the early thirties were a "pre-
statistical age" in which the depth of ignorance regarding the actual
functioning of legal processes was so great as to warrant a policy
favouring a total investment of resources in the gathering of "basic
facts" and the improvement of statistical techniques; it was only
after such an investment that jurisprudence might attempt statistical
correlation and the first tentative groping towards scientific theory:
. . . . without more effective methods of organizing and
manipulating facts and without a usable and understood analysis
of basic factors, the effort to understand the actual conditions of
justice will scarce avoid remaining incoherent and obscure. 48
Tragically, the yawning gulf between intention and deed must
condition any assessment of the tangible achievements of the
Institute in this respect. A glance at the history of the Institute
reveals that the quest for a science about law began and fizzled out
with a mindless enthusiasm for the amassing of facts without
reference to even the most rudimentary theory; specific techniques
for the study of legal processes were never developed and the
promise of comparative research was never fulfilled.
Writing a decade later, Yntema acknowledged his mistake in
staking the future of legal science on quantitative methods alone.
. . . . statistical studies have been projected on the supposition
that, given a sufficient base, the phenomena of litigation will
reflect significant trends or stresses in the social structure or
function, as well as permit the formulation of regularities within
the adjudicative process itself. But such studies are perforce of
the shotgun type; and, when a precise examination of individual
46. The Implications of Legal Science, supra, note 23 at 300-301
47. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins University Circular: The Institute for the Study of
Law (1929-30), (Statement by Faculty)
48. Supra, note 22 at 356
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conflicts that have festered to the threshold of litigation is to be
made, there is often a case for qualitative rather than quantitative
modes of investigation.
In other words, it would seem that the election of a quantitative
method influences the choice of the matter to be examined and
the problem to be resolved. To use statistics, there must be
observable repetitious events; and, what is not always under-
stood, the terms in which such events may be analysed must be
relatively simple. If the phenomena inquired into are unusual or if
they are not resolved into a limited number of factors,
quantitative formulation is either of minimal significance or
cumbrous.
Moreover, economy in the utilization of research energies here
too has bearing.
... . All this counsels that, while it is most necessary to secure
precise, quantitative knowledge where it is feasible and
appropriate, it is also expedient to employ more expeditious, if
less exact, techniques of objective inquiry where they are
indicated. To invoke once more our medical simile, the structure
of the heart is not distinctively a quantitative problem.4 9
Furthermore, writing in 1960, Yntema stated his belief that one of
legal realism's major failures was in its blindness to the need for
comparative research and its inability to grasp the fact that
comparison was an essential method of all science. 50 It is true that
Yntema himself was one of the few scholars to realize this truth at
the time5 ' but he must bear a certain share of the blame for not
steering the Institute of Law or his other realist colleagues in this
crucial direction. Nevertheless, it is to his eternal credit that he did
leave the comfortable armchair of speculation and actually
attempted to apply scientific methods to legal phenomena and that
49. "Law and Learning Theory" Through the Looking Glass of Legal Theory
(1944), 53 Yale L. J. 338 at 344-45
50. American Legal Realism in Retrospect, supra, note 23 at 328-29:
There was little systematic study of other legal systems, even of those in the
British orbit, such as developed on the Continent of Europe, and still less a
general understanding of the basic importance of comparison as an essential
method of all science, including that of law. To this legal realism in the United
States was relatively blind, not merely because it accentuated the study of law in
terms of current local practice but perhaps also because it was affected by the
notion . . . that such study should not be characterized as scientific since the
phenomena to be considered are too nonpredictable.
See also Yntema's Comparative Legal Research -Some Remarks on Looking out
of the Cave (1956), 54 Mich. L. Rev. 899
5 I. E.g., Yntema, Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative Law in 2 Law: A
Century of Progress (1937) at 346 and esp. 360-364. See also the suggestions
contained in the programme of the Institute of Law.
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he was one of the few scholars of his generation to recognize the
significance of Underhill Moore's application of a natural science
model in the furtherance of modem jurisprudence.
52
Like Yntema, Herman Oliphant owed much to Cook's analysis of
scientific thinking but his own conception of science was a good
deal less complex:
... a method is scientific if it impersonalizes the observation it
seeks to the degree required by the particular purpose for which
the results of that observation are to be used. In this view of the
matter, two aspects of scientific methods or procedures are meant
to be stressed: the impersonality of the result and the relativity of
the necessary degree of such impersonality.
5 3
Oliphant's approach represented an attempt to harness the natural
science model to the jurisprudential enterprise without tying it to the
exacting demands of such precise disciplines as physics and
chemistry. Indeed, both Oliphant and Yntema were keenly sensitive
to the criticism levelled by those who proclaimed the ultimate
futility of the quest for a legal science on the ground that it could
never attain the precision, accuracy, and predictability of the
established physical sciences. 54 Oliphant quickly recognized that
the scope for controlled experimentation in this area was severely
limited and he made the telling point that a science about law may
yet remain genuinely "scientific" even though it is largely
observational rather than experimental in basic character. After all,
the prestigious disciplines of astronomy and geology were
predominantly observational and the self-appointed guardians of
scientific purity had not impugned their acknowledged scientific
virtue. Similarly, Oliphant demonstrated that it was ludicrously
myopic to demand that a social science should always attain the
same degree of exactitude as that allegedly required in physics.
52. "Law and Learning Theory" Through the Looking Glass of Legal Theory,
supra, note 49 at 340:
A showing that in a limited number of observed segments of human conduct
variations occur, unintentionally with the absence or presence of acts or signs
designed to regulate such conduct, and that such variations can be measured and
interpreted to exhibit regularities . . . is an indication that human conduct
generally in the presence of legal regulations is subject to regular and
measurable variations . . . . It has the significance that human conduct as the
object of legal regulations and the effects of such regulations on such conduct
are susceptible of Scientific observation and measurement.
53. Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, supra, note 31 at 130-131
54. See, e.g., Yntema, The Implications of Legal Science, supra, note 23 at
283-284
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Clearly, to the physicist the precise placing of decimal points may
well hold the only key to the solution of important problems but to
the social scientist such painstaking precision would usually be
entirely superfluous.
5 5
Curiously enough, Oliphant was the only member of the scientist
trio to develop scientific theory in relation to the legal process. For
this endeavor, he adapted the teachings of experimental psychology
to the study of judicial opinions. 56 However, his stimulus -
response theory of decision-making was only a rather tentative
application of terminology to old problems rather than a systematic
attempt to understand the dynamics of decision-making. Ironically,
Oliphant took his cue from Cook in frittering away the natural
science model on the development of what amounted to little more
than a novel method of analysing appellate case law. A parallel tale
of woe may be found in Oliphant's work at the Institute of Law
which is open to exactly the same criticism as that justly levelled at
Yntema.
IV. The Delimitation of a Focus ofInquiry
Our case material is a gold mine for scientific work. It has not
been scientifically exploited.
57
Of the three scholars, only Hessel Yntema may be said to have
discussed the fashioning of an adequate focus of jurisprudential
inquiry with any degree of explicitness. Like a good many others in
the realist movement, Yntema was determined that legal rules
should no longer hold the center stage of jurisprudential debate. In
his view, the proper focus of a modem legal science was the
'problem of order in human affairs":
The interest of legal science in the phenomena of human order -
as to how, in the present instance, the exchange of goods is
regulated, not only according to the books but in fact, as to what
the agencies, procedures and rules of such regulation are and how
they fit into the businesses and lives which are thus controlled, as
to what are the effective devices of such regulation and what its
actual effects - will give legal science sufficient coherence
55. Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, supra, note 33passim.
56. It seems that Oliphant's behavioralistic theory has certain affinities to
Underhill Moore's early approach - see, Moore, Rational Basis of Legal
Institutions (1923), 23 Colum. L. Rev. 609. A genuinely systematic application of
such a theory did not finally materialize until Moore and Callahan published their
Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control (1943), 53 Yale L. J. 9
57. Oliphant, id. at 229
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without asserting for it a sterile isolation from other branches of
human science.
58
Yntema believed that this focus of inquiry would enable the legal
scientist to cast his spotlight over the distinctively legal in the social
process while guarding against the temptation to grant jurisprudence
a roving commission over the whole area that may be said to
constitute the subject matter of the social sciences. Sadly, it must be
stated that Yntema's brave words were never translated into action.
Along with Cook and Oliphant, he contracted the realist disease of
concentrating upon the activities of courts and court-connected
officials to the complete exclusion of the legislative process. In an
age in which legislation came to dominate the political scene, this
was indeed a most curious omission. As Yntema himself was to
acknowledge many years later:
There has been . . . a prodigious development of legislation
as the efficient means to secure the national interest, to control
the economy, and to readjust the political and social constitution
as conditions change. Legislation has become the instrument of
reform, and in consequence its volume and complexity has
absorbed the attention of those concerned with law, indeed on
this account, the positive prescriptions of the national state, and
not the common sense of justice of its people, are envisaged as
the law. 5 9
Ironically, it was Walter Wheeler Cook who maintained the most
narrow focus of inquiry. While he frequently referred to the need for
the closer study of the behaviour of officials other than judges,60 he
nevertheless confined his attention to the decisions of American
appellate courts. 61 This approach was no doubt an advance over the
rule-oriented jurisprudence of the past but it also constituted the
fundamental flaw in realist writings. Oliphant and Yntema, on the
other hand, ultimately contrived a focus of inquiry which took under
58. The Implications of Legal Science, supra, note 23 at 298-300
59. American Legal Realism in Retrospect, supra, note 23 at 325-26. Quite why
this omission was perpetuated remains a mystery, particularly since Roscoe Pound
had attempted to rectify it as early as 1912; see, e.g., his Legislation as a Social
Function (VIII Pub. Amer. Sociological Society, 1912) at 148
60. See, e.g., Cook's statement that the task of jurisprudence is to study the
behavior of "govemmental officials". The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution
of Legal Problems, in Lectures on Legal Topics (New York: MacMillan's Co.,
1928) at 337. See also similar statements in The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflicts of Laws, supra, note 25 at 8, 29-30 and, supra, note 24 at 204
61. Note Jerome Frank's scathing criticism of Cook in this respect: Modern and
Ancient Legal Pragmatism - John Dewey & Co. v. Aristotle (1950), 25 Notre
Dame Law. 207 at 255
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its panoply not only the traditional appellate fare but also the
decisions of trial courts and other officials participating in what may
be loosely termed the administration of justice; this focus is most
noticeably manifested in their surveys of Ohio and New York for
the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law. Significantly, authoritative
decision-making in other arenas was blithely ignored and, even in
their discussion of administrative decision-making, Oliphant and
Yntema were conspicuously superficial.
V. The Balance of Emphasis upon Perspectives and Operations
... . we have focused our attention too largely on the vocal
behavior of judges in deciding cases. A study with more stress on
their nonvocal behavior - i.e., what the judges actually do when
stimulated by the facts of the case before them - is the approach
indispensable to scientifically exploiting the wealth of material in
the cases. 62
On first sight, the approach of Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema to the
necessity of maintaining an adequate balance of emphasis between
operations and perspectives appears to be tainted with the worst
excesses of behavioralism. Critics seized upon their vociferous calls
for a more thorough study of judicial behavior and charged them
with abandoning the essence of things legal - authoritative ideals,
principles, and rules.63 No doubt, many of these charges contain a
fair degree of truth but such criticism tends to ignore the context
within which the scientists made their controversial assertions. The
work of Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema represents a cross-roads at
which the lessons to be learned from linguistic analysis and
pragmatism (as purveyed by Dewey and Holmes) met and joined
forces in an assault on formal logic. It is in this light that the trio's
statements about legal rules and judicial opinions must be viewed.
For the realists, the jurisprudential idol which they most
assiduously attempted to destroy was the notion that judicial
decisions were rendered on the basis of logical derivation from
fundamental principles of the law. That this notion was not entirely
a dummy overstuffed with straw may be demonstrated by Mortimer
Adler's contribution to a symposium on Jerome Frank's Law and
62. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, supra, note 33 at 229
63. See, e.g., Pound, Contemporary Juristic Theory (Claremont Colleges, 1940)
at 10-11; Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision
(1931), 79 U.Pa.L.Rev. 833 and Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration,
id. at 1052; Kennedy,A Review of Legal Realism (1940), 9 Fordham L. Rev. 362
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the Modern Mind in 1931.64 In his article, Adler asserted that there
was room in the halls of jurisprudence for what he termed "law in
discourse". This would be a "purely formal science" like
mathematics, "its subject matter is entirely propositional, its only
instrumentality is formal logic"; indeed, this formal science would
deal "with certainties and nothing else". 65 Now it was precisely
this assertion, that jurisprudence (or any branch of it) could conduct
its activities without reference to empirical reality, which
constituted the red flag to which the realists responded. Adler's
view of the function of formal logic appeared to suggest that a legal
science could be built around the task of achieving formal
consistency between fundamental rules and principles. Realists,
such as Cook and Yntema, attributed the same views to such
scholars as Joseph Beale and Herbert Goodrich, whose work they
submitted to devastating criticism.66
In their attack on formal logic, the realists drew on the authority
of Oliver Wendell Holmes rather than on Roscoe Pound's equally
incisive treatment of what he termed "mechanical
jurisprudence". 67 For Holmes, legal logic meant thinking in
syllogisms - the neat collaboration of major and minor premise to
produce solutions to problems: as he said at the beginning of The
Common Law,
It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a
particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics.68
64. Adler, Legal Certainty (1931), 31 Colum.L.Rev. 91. Note the criticism of this
approach by Cook and Yntema; Cook, Legal Logic (1931), 31 Colum.L.Rev. 108;
Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science (1931), 31 Colum.L.Rev. 924 at
929-934
65. Adler, id., at 103
66. See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, supra, note
25; Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws (1927-28), 37 Yale L.
J. 468
67. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908), 8 Colum.L.Rev. 605
68. Holmes, The Common Law (ed. Howe, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963)
at 5
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In an exposition of the nature of logic (which found favor with
Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema), John Dewey argued that the
deductive logic referred to by Justice Holmes was but one type of
logic in use. In Dewey's view, the syllogism merely sets forth the
results of thinking - "it has nothing to do with the operation of
thinking"; it is a logic of exposition rather than a logic of inquiry.
69
On the other hand, Dewey's account of logical method represents
the actual procedures used by human beings in reaching solutions to
concrete problems and, as a result, logic must necessarily be
complemented by empirical science:
If thought or intelligence is the means of intentional reconstruc-
tion of experience, then logic, as an account of the procedure of
thought, is not purely formal . . . . If thinking is the way in
which deliberate reorganization of experience is secured, then
logic is such a clarified and systematized formulation of the
procedures of thinking as will enable the desired reconstruction to
go on more economically and efficiently . . . . Logic is based on
a definite and executive supply of empirical material.
70
In the experimental logic Dewey favored, men do not begin
thinking with premises; on the contrary, they attempt to solve
problems by finding statements both of general principle and of
particular fact, which are capable of serving as premises. This
search necessarily involves a consideration both of consequences
and of social policy. In so far as logic is relevant to modem
jurisprudence the implications of Dewey's approach are clearly
far-reaching; if logic is to have further utility in this arena then it
must be a "logic relative to consequences rather than to
antecedents, a logic of prediction of probabilities rather than one of
deduction of certainties" .71 Furthermore, in Dewey's approach, the
status of general principles and rules is fundamentally transformed:
69. Dewey, Logical Method and the Law (1924), 10 Cornell L.Q. 17 at 22. For a
detailed discussion of the pragmatic approach to logic - as developed by Holmes
and Dewey - see Gerhard Casper, Juristischer Realismus und Politische Theorie
im Amerikanischen Rechtsdenken (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1967) at 28ff.
The enormous influence exerted on legal realism by Dewey's work is discussed by
Patterson in John Dewey and the Law: Theories of Legal Reasoning and Valuation
(1950), 36 A.B.A.J. 619. It is interesting to note that John Dewey taught a joint
seminar in Legal Philosophy at Columbia from 1924-1929 and was therefore a
colleague to Oliphant and Yntema. See also J. W. Murphy, John Dewey - A
Philosophy of Law for Democracy (1960), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 291
70. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948 ed.) at
134-35
71. Logical Method and the Law, supra, note 69 at 26
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For the purposes of a logic of inquiry into probable
consequences, general principles can only be tools justified by
the work they do. They are means of intellectual survey,
analysis, and insight into the factors of the situation to be dealt
with. Like other tools they must be modified when they are
applied to new conditions and new results have to be
achieved ....
Failure to recognize that general legal rules and principles are
working hypotheses, needing to be constantly tested by the way
in which they work out in application to concrete situations,
explains the otherwise paradoxical fact that the slogans of the
liberalism of one period often become the bulwarks of reaction in
a subsequent era.
72
It was around this pragmatic interpretation of the nature of rules and
principles that Cook, Yntema, and Oliphant constructed their own
approach to their analysis of judicial decision-making.
However, there was one other trend of contemporary thought
which exerted a not inconsiderable influence on the three scholars'
work; this was the burgeoning field of semantics and linguistic
analysis. One of the most influential works of this genre was Ogden
and Richards' The Meaning of Meaning (1923) 73 which stressed the
need for the scholar to maintain a skeptical attitude towards
language. In particular, the authors focussed their attention on the
relationship between verbal symbols and their empirical referents
and on the dangers caused by the emotive power of many words
frequently used in jurisprudential inquiry - such as "liberty" or
"right". The thrust of works of this nature was to exorcise the
verbal magic associated with formal logic and for this reason their
message was avidly accepted by the legal realists; as Ogden and
Richards' pointed out,
The extent to which primitive attitudes towards words are still
exploited is fully revealed only when the achievements of some
cynical rhetorician are accorded the limelight of the law courts
... . the ablest logicians are precisely those who are led to
evolve the most fantastic systems by the aid of their verbal
technique. The modern logician may, in time to come, be
regarded as the true mystic, when the rational basis of the world
in which he believes is scientifically examined. 74
72. Id. at 26
73. For the influence of the book on legal realism, see Patterson, Jurisprudence:
Men and Ideas of the Law (Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1953) at 26ff. and 546.
Apart from Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema, two other realists clearly influenced by
the work were Thurman Arnold and Jerome Frank.
74. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (8th ed. New York:
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These trends in thought are most clearly manifested in the work
of Walter Wheeler Cook. He embraced Dewey's approach to logic
enthusiastically and, in the light of experimental logic, he asserted
that legal rules and principles may best be viewed in behavioral
terms - or, more specifically, as generalizations summarizing the
past behavior of judges (and similar officials). 75 At first, Cook
approached the question from the viewpoint of the practising lawyer
and maintained that the function of such generalizations was to be
"useful tools" in helping lawyers to predict the future behavior of
these officials; in this he refined Justice Holmes' rather crude
prediction theory but nevertheless the approach was manifestly
inadequate. 76 In later years, Cook came to stress a further function
of rules and principles - namely that of serving as aids to judges so
that they might recall past decisions and note the social and
economic policies underlying them; in this respect, they arrange and
order past experience in a form which can best help decision-makers
deal with future experience. 77 Needless to say, rules and principles
of law are - in common with every other type of generalization -
avowedly tentative in nature and no dusty tome of jurisprudence or
eloquent judicial utterance can transform them into the immutable
principles dreamed of by the adherents of mechanical jurisprudence:
every generalization we make is subject to just this
limitation: we can with confidence treat it as "valid" only within
the range of past experience upon which it is based, and when we
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1946) at 40
75. Scientific Method and the Law, supra, note 8 at 308; The Utility of
Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems in Lectures on Legal Topics (New
York: MacMillan, 1928) at 337; The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws, supra, note 25 at 8
76.When a lawyer is confronted with what we call a legal problem, what he wishes
to know, in order to reach a solution, is how certain governmental officials -
judges and others - will be confronted by the given situation. He, as much as
the physical scientist, is therefore engaged in trying to prophesy future physical
events; The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems, supra,
note 60 at 337. For criticism of the "crude" prediction theory, see David H.
Moskowitz, The Prediction Theory of Law (1966), 39 Temp. L.Q. 413; Hart,
The Concept of Law (Oxford U.P., 1961) at 38ff. However, the criticism is
mainly directed at a straw realism; See E. Hunter Taylor Jr., H.L.A. Hart's
Concept of Law in the Perspective of Legal Realism (1972), 35 Mod.L.Rev.
606. Certainly, Moskowitz and Hart ignore the more mature approach of Cook
in their assessment of realism.
77. See, e.g., the revision of his original paper -The Logical and Legal Bases of
the Conflict of Laws (1924), 33 Yale L.J. 457 - in the 1942 book of the same
name (see supra, note 25)
78. A Scientific Approach to the Study of Law, supra, note 24 at 211-212
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wish to use it we can never be sure that in putting under it the
situation which now confronts us we are justified in so doing, we
may have neglected as irrelevant aspects of the situation which
turn out, when we put our conclusion to the test of experience, to
be of the highest importance. We may express this point of view
by saying that our generalizations are convenient shorthand
summaries of past experience, enabling us to recall more easily
what those experiences were and how we interpreted and dealt
with them, summaries which aid us, as Dewey says, to bring the
net value of past experience to the scrutiny of new perplexities. 7
In formulating his generalizations, the lawyer must concentrate
"primarily upon what courts have done, rather than upon the
description they have given of the reasons for their action". 79 Cook
believed that this approach would eliminate the major vice of
traditional legal scholarship - namely, that many supposed rules or
principles were so broadly stated as to go far beyond any existing
trends in decisions and that many others were so vague as to be
virtually useless either as a basis for accurate prediction or as
indicators of the relevant considerations of social policy.
8 0
The most celebrated application of this approach was Cook's
incisive analysis of Beale's vested rights theory in the conflict of
laws. 8 1 Cook's objection to Beale's theory was that the premises of
his formal logic were based not upon observation but upon
metaphysical reflection as to the "essential nature of law and legal
rights",82 Cook argued that, in its futile quest for universal
acceptance of fundamental rules, the vested rights theory seriously
distorted what the courts were doing in fact. In his view, close
examination of judicial behavior compels acceptance of a "local
law theory":
79.Whatever generalizations we reach will therefore purport to be first of all an
attempt to describe in as simple a way as possible the concrete judicial
phenomena observed, and their 'validity' will be measured by their
effectiveness in accomplishing that purpose. In other words, they will be
regarded as 'true' only in so far as they enable us to handle effectively the
concrete materials with which we must deal.
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, supra, note 25 at 8
80. See, e.g., Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life (1917-18), 27
Yale L.J. 779
8 1. The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, supra, note 25 at Ch. 1
82. Id. at 5-8. Note that Beale was also a prime target for Jerome Frank in his Law
and the Modern Mind (New York: Coward-McConn, 1930). In his contribution to a
symposium on Frank's book, Cook attributed similar views to other "of our legal
brethren" but they remained unnamed: see, Law and the Modern Mind: A
Symposium (1931), 31 Colum.L.R. 82 at 110
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.... the forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign
elements always applies its own law to the case, but in doing so
adopts and enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or
at least highly similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of
decision found in the system of law in force in another state or
country with which some or all of the foreign elements are
connected, the rule so selected being in many groups of cases,
and subject to the exceptions to be noted later, the rule of
decision which the given foreign state or country would apply,
not to this very group of facts now before the court of the forum,
but to a similar but purely domestic group of facts involving for
the foreign court no foreign element. The rule thus "incorpo-
rated" into the law of the forum may for convenience be called
the "domestic rule" of the foreign state, as distinguished from its
rule applicable to cases involving foreign elements. The forum
thus enforces not a foreign right but a right created by its own
law. 8 3
In these circumstances, Cook contended that it was completely
unrealistic to speak - as did Beale - of the enforcement of rights
as defined and created by the law of a foreign jurisdiction. As one
commentator has noted, Cook's contribution in this regard "lies in
the realization that the function of the conflict of laws is not the
preservation of international order but the carrying out of local law
and policy" .
84
However, it was not in the development of empirical observation
alone that Cook put his faith. In his view, there was also a
compelling need for a modem analytical jurisprudence; such a
discipline was needed in order to combat the failure of traditional
scholarship to establish generalizations which were free from
ambiguity. In Cook's view, many legal rules and principles which
were perfectly capable of serving as accurate generalizations - if
properly interpreted - were vitiated by the flaw of ambiguity in
terminology.8 5 The particular vehicle chosen for the task of
combatting such deficiencies was Hohfeld's framework of funda-
mental legal conceptions. 86 Cook published a series of articles in
which he claimed the adoption of Hohfeldian terminology would
83. The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, supra, note 25 at 20-21
84. Nygh, Conflict of Laws in Australia (2nd ed. Sydney: Butterworths, 1971) at
82-83
85. Supra, note 80 at 785
86. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, ed. Walter Wheeler Cook (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963 ed.)
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result in more satisfactory decision-making; 87 nevertheless he was
swift to acknowledge that such analysis was only a means to a
greater end:
Analysis is necessary but not sufficient. Analysis enables us to
see just what our problem is; to discover hidden analogies, or
differences which but for the analysis might have escaped our
attention. The choice between the competing analogies which
analysis has revealed must naturally be based upon considera-
tions of social or economic policy, of the end to be reached and of
the best means of reaching the end when it is known. 88
Hessel Yntema's approach to these issues was remarkably similar
to that maintained by Cook - although, in Yntema's case, the most
influential intellectual precursor appears to have been Holmes rather
than Dewey. 89 One specific area in which Yntema lent his support
to Cook's general approach was his emphatic rejection of Adler's
notion that there was utility in a logic divorced from empirical
reality:
. . . . If the realm of law were like mathematics compounded of
hypotheses of the stuff which dreams are made of, no one would
object to peopling the legal world with principles, rights or other
juristic constructions. But law is not logic, however usefully
logic may be made to serve the ends of law. And any system of
thought so fragmentary as to base the actual statement or reform
of law upon purely logical deductions from combinations of
abstract symbols without careful analysis of the practical
purposes of legal traditions and institutions considered with
reference to the concrete case is not merely obscurant but socially
dangerous. Only by constantly checking the hypotheses resulting
from logical manipulations against observation and experience
87. See, e.g., The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems,
supra, note 60 at 389-390; The Alienability of Choses in Action (1916), 29
Harv.L.Rev. 816 and (1917), 30 Harv.L.Rev. 449
88. The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems, supra, note 60
at 367; Hohfeld held the same view:
.... he emphasized over and over again - especially in his notable address
before the Association of American Law Schools upon A Vital School of
Jurisprudence - that analytical work merely paves the way for other branches
of jurisprudence, and that without the aid of the latter satisfactory solutions of
legal problems cannot be reached. Thus, legal analysis to him was primarily a
means to an end, a necessary aid in discovering just what the problems are
which confront the courts.
Cook, Introduction to Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra, note 86 at
4
89. See, e.g., Yntema, Justice Holmes' View of Legal Science (1931-32), 40 Yale
L.J. 696
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can we hope to approximate practical truth or justice in the
administration of law. 90
Yntema also followed Cook in directing his scalpel at the core of
the vested rights theory although it was Goodrich rather than Beale
whose work was submitted to scathing criticism. Drawing upon the
lessons to be gleaned from Semantics, Yntema demonstrated that
the verbal symbols employed in the vested rights theory were both
too far removed from reality and too few to create classifications
that were of any use to anyone attempting to uncover the social and
economic policies underlying judicial decision-making; as a result,
the theory was of no use whatsoever in describing what the courts
were actually doing:
To say that laws "exist" within defined geographical limits; that
by these laws rights are "created" and so "exist" until they are
destroyed by operation of law; that furthermore, there are
"principles" which invest these rights with the powers of
migrating from state to state; and that by virtue of these principles
rights so vested are recognized and enforced in foreign courts is
to express in crass symbols the most complex syntheses of
phenomena. 91
Curiously enough, Yntema did not share his colleague's enthusiasm
for analytical jurisprudence as a preparatory remedy to these
linguistic defects in traditional scholarship.
For Yntema, legal rules and principles are no more than tentative
classifications of recurrent phenomena in judicial decision-making.
In this sense, such rules and principles are intelligible only if they
are viewed within the context of the concrete judicial experience
they purport to represent; by themselves they amount to little more
than "mnemonic devices" - "useful but hollow diagrams of what
has been". In Yntema's words,
Human activities must be analysed and described for legal
purposes in terms and rules, all of them symbolic of the activities
to which they advert. But to say that the rule is the law, that the
symbol is reality, leaves us still in the squirrel-cage of
conceptualism; it is only less objectionable than defining law in
terms of general principles to the extent that the rules embrace a
narrower scope . . . . the language of the law, its concepts and
90. The Rational Basis of Legal Science, supra, note 64 at 931 quoting from The
Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, supra, note 66
91. The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, supra, note 66 at 476. The
Specific work Yntema criticised was Goodrich's Handbook on the Conflict of Laws
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1927)
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rules, is indispensable as a vehicle for expressing thought. This it
can do but imperfectly and more it cannot.
9 2
Like his colleagues, Oliphant was profoundly affected by the
assault of Dewey and Holmes upon the bastions of formal logic.
Following these two scholars, Oliphant argued that faith in such
logic was the inevitable outcome of man's futile quest for
certainty. 93 In his view, the tyranny of such modes of thinking
emanated from a medieval scholasticism which continued to
permeate the ranks of jurisprudence. Within the context of an
introduction to Rueff's book, From the Physical to the Social
Sciences (1929),9 4 Oliphant (together with Abraham Hewitt)
exposed the fruits of such scholasticism to a withering analysis.
In what has become a classic of American Realist literature,
Oliphant and Hewitt demonstrated the manifest incapacity of either
deductive or inductive logic to function as a technique of
problem - solving. The first target of their attack was the mental
process by means of which general principles of law are divined by
some mysterious process of intuitive thought. In the so-called
"transcendental approach", the general principles so arrived at are
employed as the major premises of the deductive syllogism which
characterized traditional jurisprudence. However, as Oliphant and
Hewitt demonstrated, the fatal flaw in this approach is the fact that
equally valid lines of argument leading to the exactly opposite result
in each individual case can be constructed with relative ease:
... . for any case wherein there is a clash of two groups having
conflicting interests, two conflicting major premises can always
be formulated, one embodying one set of interests, the other
embodying the other. Each group has had its advocate to
formulate its interests into general propositions and our novel
cases all involve some conflict of interests:
92. The Hornbook Method, id. at 481
93. Oliphant, The Relation of Current Economic and Social Problems to the
Restatement of the Law (1923), 10 Law and Justice No. 3 at 20:
Mr. Justice Holmes has attributed it to the innate desire of the human mind for a
deceptive sense of mathematical exactitude to flatter its longing for certainty
and repose . . . . Professor Dewey has added, as an explanation of the
persistence of this method of thought, the existence of an aesthetic quality in the
human mind which responds to the form and symmetry of the syllogism and is
cold to the apparent disorder of experimental thinking.
See Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and
Action (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960 ed.)
94. Jacques Rueff, From the Physical to the Social Sciences (trans. by H. Green,
Institute of Law, Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore)
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That two such conflicting major premises can always be found
is but the result of the fundamental futility of this approach as a
method of determining how novel cases should be decided.
95
In sharp contrast, the "inductive" approach does not put its faith
in fundamental principles of law as the basis of its deductive
syllogism; instead it purports to derive its major premises from past
decided cases. However, as Oliphant and Hewitt point out, this
approach cannot fumish solutions to novel cases because, ex
hypothesi, any generalization from past cases cannot include the
case to be decided in the novel situation. 9 6 In the end result, the
inductive approach shares exactly the same weakness with the
transcendental approach - namely that the selection of a major
premise necessarily involves the choice of the decision-maker and
such a choice is exercised in an arena where both parties to the
litigation may with equal validity use either logical approach to
"prove" exactly opposite propositions. 97 The conclusion to be
drawn from this analysis corresponds closely to that reached by
Cook and Yntema; a modem problem-solving logic must place its
trust in empirical methods and, in this sense, traditional logic has
been grossly abused:
Under the guise of logic . . . we have methods purely arbitrary,
everything depending on the choice of the major premise. This is
not objectionable as method; the abuse lies in applying logic in
the proper sphere of the empirical. When so applied, there is
nothing to insure that the major premise chosen bears any useful
relation to prevalent social values-the essence of justice. It is
quite as likely to be the dogma of a medieval ghost still ruling us
from the mists of antiquity. 9 8
Although Oliphant's treatment of logic was closely related to that
of Cook and Yntema, his approach to legal rules and principles was
notable for its avowed behavioralism. No doubt influenced by
Underhill Moore, 99 Oliphant enthusiastically embraced Watsonian
psychology and set about purging legal science of its excessive
concentration on subjectivities:
95. Hewitt and Oliphant, Introduction to Rueff, id. at XV-XVI
96. id. at XIX
97. For further discussion of the concept of complementarity or paired-opposites,
see, McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy - Oriented Approach to
Legal Study (1956), 1 Natural L. Forum 53 at 61-62
98. Supra, note 95 at XXI
99. See, e.g., Moore, The Rational Basis of Legal Institutions (1923), 23 Colum
L. Rev. 609
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The trouble is that we have been concentrating for some centuries
upon data of such subjectivity as the layman's, judge's, or
legislator's avowed or imagined motives rather than being
content with first accurately acquainting ourselves with such
objective data as their observable activity under fixed or variable
conditions. Naturally we have come to feel that our materials in
the social sciences are illusive. Just so would the botanist if,
through his pages, wood-nymphs and satyrs still paraded. l00
One of the major casualties in this purge was to be the traditional
scholastic deference to judicial opinions. In a valiant attempt to
excise subjectivity from the analysis of judicial decision-making,
Oliphant adopted the terminology of learning theory and argued that
the "constant factor" which may serve as the sure foundation for
empirical legal science was the court's response to the stimuli of the
facts of the concrete cases before them. "Not the judges' opinions,
but which way they decide cases, will be the dominant
subject-matter of any truly scientific study of law". '0 ' In Oliphant's
view, the course of American legal scholarship since the
mid-nineteenth century was marked by a remorseless retreat from
the construction of generalizations which adequately describe the
factual underpinnings of concrete judicial decisions. Oliphant
alleged that, under the influence of European jurisprudence,
American courts and scholars switched their attention to the
promulgation of absolutes and universals and, in this process, the
focus of jurisprudence was shifted to the "essays of
rationalization"1 0 2 which clothe judicial decisions. While he was
prepared to admit that opinions were a legitimate object of study in
limited circumstances, Oliphant nevertheless banished them from
the consciousness of empirical science:
The thesis is that facts are the only stimuli capable of scientific
study as a basis of prediction. Prior rationalizations are rejected
for this purpose because the facts prevail when they diverge from
the prior generalizations, and, for each rationalization indicating
one result, a contradictory one indicating the opposite result can
usually be found. The utility of prior rationalizations in the study
100. Facts, Opinions and Value-Judgments, supra, note 31 at 135-36
101. A Return to Stare Decisis, supra, note 33 at 225
102. More and more we have been taking abstractions of the past - many going
back to medieval scholasticism - and tracing them down, not through the
holdings of the cases, but through the opinions to see how they have fared in
those essays of rationalization.
Id. at 224
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of judicial forensics, and the utility of such forensics are not
being discussed at this time. 
1 0 3
For Oliphant, therefore, legal rules and principles were the toothless
annoury of an outworn logic and thus undeserving of emphasis in a
science about law.
We are now in a position to delineate the balance of emphasis
between operations and perspectives maintained in the work of the
three scientists. In the case of Cook and Yntema a curious paradox
emerges; while they tried to operationalize the notion of legal rules
and principles the outcome of their efforts was nevertheless a new
species of legal doctrine rather than a genuine effort to re-classify
the phenomena of past judicial decision-making in scientifically
relevant terms. Although Cook and Yntema hammered out the
theme that decisions must be observed from an impartial
observational standpoint and that the fruits of such observation will
furnish the legal scientist with tentative generalizations which will
aid the task of prediction, they were nevertheless uncharacteristi-
cally coy when it came to the question of suggesting concrete
methods by which such a goal might be accomplished. One might
well ask exactly what "facts" can be considered relevant in the
formulation of the scientifically based generalizations heralded by
Cook and Yntema? Furthermore, was the modern jurisprude to rely
on the facts adduced in the record of a case or was he to cast his net
wider onto the type of background facts which constituted the grist
for Underhill Moore's ill-fated institutional banking studies?
104
Since such crucial questions were never answered the inevitable
conclusion to be drawn is that much of Cook and Yntema's analysis
was argumentative rhetoric rather than a serious blue-print for a
strictly empirical approach.
Nevertheless, the critics of legal realism took Cook and Yntema's
words at face value and they were swift to point out that a purely
behavioral treatment of judicial decision-making emasculates one of
the central features of the whole process. As Dickinson pointed out
in 1931,
while it is true that a study of the decisional behavior of past
103. Id. at 226n.
104. Moore and Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting
of Direct Discounts (1931), 40 Yale L.J. 381, 555, 752,928, 1055, 1219; Moore,
Sussman, and Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to stop
Payment of Checks (1933), 42 Yale L.J. 817, 1198; Moore, Sussman, and
Corstvet, Drawing Against Uncollected Checks (1935-36), 45 Yale L.J. 1, 260
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judges can be expected to shed light on what their successors will
do, this is for the most part dependably so only to the extent that
judges follow rules and precedents, or in other words make a
deliberate effort to imitate their predecessors. Resemblance based
upon such deliberate and conscious imitation is fundamentally
unlike the automatic repetition of like reactions in the behavior of
physical bodies under like circumstances; for it operates
indirectly through the mental understanding which the later judge
has of what the earlier judge has done . . . . In this sense the
form of words through which earlier decisions are transmitted to
the minds of later judges becomes a factor of the highest
importance. 105
The irony implicit in statements such as this is that Cook and
Yntema would have wholeheartedly agreed with its central
proposition. Although they each stressed the importance of
predicting decisions on the basis of their "new" type of
generalization they nevertheless recognized that this aspect of the
matter was relevant only to the legal practitioner; both of them
envisaged that their re-formulated rules would also guide judges in
the process of choice confronting them. Like Dewey, Cook and
Yntema believed that legal rules and principles - as they were
shaped by generations of judges - have a prima facie claim to be
taken as indicating the best ways which experience has shown of
dealing with the types of case to which they refer.' 06 Where they
differed from their critics was in their rejection of excessively broad
rules which buried such experience in a pyramid of abstract
universals and absolutes. For them, the new generalizations must
draw adequate distinctions between the "facts" of past cases and
they must do so in terms of the relevant social and economic policy
which shaped the judges' choice. To all intents and purposes this
was in effect a call for a more sophisticated legal doctrine; it was
surely not an abandonment of perspectives in favor of concentrating
on bare physical operations in the manner attempted by Underhill
Moore. Indeed, in 1941, Yntema expressed considerable surprise at
the manner in which even venerable critics such as Roscoe Pound
had misinterpreted the position of the realist movement in this
matter. As we have seen, the reason for such misrepresentation was
- to a great extent - the exaggerated rhetoric of the realists
themselves; however, Yntema's defence of their position is worthy
105. Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, supra,
note 63 at 840-41
106. See Patterson, supra, note 69 at 622
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of note:
If the realists really believed that legal concepts have no
significance, it would be difficult to understand why they have
been so concerned about their real significance. The fact is that
the realists, not unjustifiably supposing that general concepts
may have little consequence apart from their specific connota-
tions and perceiving the eminent possibility that certain of the
rules and concepts may serve purposes other than appear on the
surface, have been particularly concerned to ascertain the
function and effects of the conceptual apparatus in relation to
other factors affecting the legal order. That this inquiry has led
them to deny to the conceptual apparatus sole or even primary
significance in certain crucial types of cases, to suggest that
particular conventional legal formulations do not adequately
represent what is doing in the judicial process, is perhaps the
occasion for objection on the part of those who attribute unique
significance to the traditional authoritative concepts. But the
objection is not supported by its mere assertion. '
0 7
In the light of these observations, it is clear that Cook and
Yntema never asserted that the judicial opinion was of no utility to
legal science. Admittedly, their polemical style often appeared to
commit them to positions they could not sustain; however, their
adoption of the logic of pragmatism indicates that the judicial
opinion is not to be dismissed as a mere "rationalization". As
Dewey has indicated, the logic of exposition manifested in the
judge's opinion is vital not only because it ensures that the decision
will not appear as an abitrary dictum but also because it indicates a
107. Yntema, Jurisprudence on Parade, supra, note 23 at 1161. A related
criticism which was levelled at the realists in general was the somewhat fanciful
notion that realism was based on the epistemological quagmire of nominalistic
metaphysics. This criticism was mainly advanced by Morris Cohen who engaged in
frequent sparring matches with Yntema on the issue. The debate rings hollow in the
1970s but the allegation that the realists denied the existence of classes and saw
each decision as an unique experience is patently absurd. All that writers such as
Cook intended to convey was that classification is an active process in which the
classifier must always be prepared to adapt his conceptual apparatus to empirical
reality. Furthermore, as Yntema himself argued,
what the realists have pertinently pointed out . . . is that frequently a legal
situation may be classified under several . . . general conceptions, thus
rendering it necessary to look beyond the preconceived conceptual scheme for a
basis of determination. Id. at 1160-61.
See also Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, supra, note 70 at 151ff. For the
course of the debate on nominalism, see Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of
Law (1931), 31 Colum. L. Rev. 352; Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal
Science, supra, note 64, and Jurisprudence and Metaphysics - A Triangular
Correspondence (1950), 59 Yale L.J. 273
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rule for dealing with similar cases in the future. 10 8 The caveat
stressed by the pragmatists was that such a rule was only a tentative
generalization whose consequences must be rigorously assessed
before it is applied to new cases.
Although the balance of emphasis between operations and
perspectives appears to be more heavily weighted on the behavioral
scale in the case of Herman Oliphant, it is interesting to note that the
same paradox ultimately emerges. It is understandable that many
critics believed Oliphant was placing judicial decisions on a par
with the salivation of Pavlov's dogs when he adopted the
stimulus - response rhetoric. However, Oliphant never
operationalized his theory even to a minor extent - and in the end
result the theory amounted more to a vivid literary device than to a
genuine attempt to develop a systematic analysis of past decisions;
in this respect, he studiously avoided the painful steps trodden by
Underhill Moore in his own painstaking applications of learning
theory to legal phenomena. 10 9
In the ultimate analysis, Oliphant followed Cook and Yntema in
attempting to develop a more accurate technique of classifying past
judicial decisions, and his purpose, like that of his colleagues, was
to employ it in the creation of a legal doctrine which gave genuine
aid to both judges and practitioners in the performance of their
various functions. Significantly, it was Karl Llewellyn who first
recognized the direction of the underlying currents in Oliphant's
work:
Oliphant had attempted to correlate facts, issues, and results of
cases independently of the reasoning of the opinions; the essential
result from his work is that - as case-law history shows - this is
frequently, but not always, an excellent road out of confusion,
but that its effect is to give us new and clearer doctrine, to be
dealt with still along the familiar case-law lines. 110
Although Oliphant purported to eschew judicial opinions
altogether, it is clear that he only did so in so far as they discussed
past decisions in terms of absolutes and universals. Ultimately,
Oliphant wished courts to return to the assumed state of innocence
existing before the mid-nineteenth century in which past decisions
were analysed in terms of their "facts"; clearly, the judicial opinion
108. Dewey, supra, note 14 at 24
109. Moore and Callahan, Law and Learning Theory (1943), 53 Yale L.J. I
110. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (University of
Chicago Press, 1962) at 158-159
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can be of immense utility both to the future decision-maker and to
the legal scholar if it adequately records the fact and policy elements
of judicial experience.
VI. Conception ofAuthority and Control
Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema did not explicitly distinguish between
the twin concepts of authority and control. In accordance with the
dominant trend in American legal realism, they manifested scant
interest in the constitutive process by means of which authoritative
decision-makers are established in their positions and their authority
maintained. In effect, the three scholars deliberately excised the
legal process from its natural mooring in the wider polity and treated
it as a semi-closed system.
Cook, Oliphant and Yntema did not pursue the approach of
Arnold, Frank and the Scandinavian realists who brought their tools
of analysis to bear on the psychological roots of authority nor did
they seek to tread the path chosen by fledgling sociologists of law,
such as Timasheff, who explicitly posed leading questions about the
complex relationship pertaining between the formal structures of
authority and the realities of power.111 Nevertheless, it is clear that
they gave tacit recognition in their work to the imperative need for
the law to respond to changes in community perspectives and, in
this respect, they may be said to have adopted an implied concept of
authority.
Fundamental to the approach of Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema was
a whole-hearted acceptance of Holmes' aphorism that legal rules
and principles are interpreted and applied against the backcloth of
"the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men."
' 112
However, it was the activist twist given to this notion by Wesley
11l. These trends in European thought were in a process of germination when the
realist movement was in full swing during the 30s and it is true that Yntema fully
recognized their significance in 1941; see Jurisprudence on Parade, supra, note 23
passim. However, the work of Frank and Arnold clearly indicates that there was no
lack of source material for those who wished to pursue a comprehensive
investigation of the authoritative component of law. For the major Scandinavian
work at this time, see Olivecrona, Law as Fact (2nd ed. London: Stevens & Sons,
1971). For Timasheff's discussion of ethico-imperative forms of social
co-ordination, see N.S. Timasheff, An Introduction to the Sociology of Law
(Harvard Univ. Committee on Research in the Social Sciences, 1939)
112. Discussed in Yntema, supra, note 89 at 698
Cook, Oliphant and Yntema
Newcomb Hohfeld which most visibly shaped the three scholars'
conception of authority. In 1914, Hohfeld had given a stirring
address to the Association of American Law Schools in which he
had placed particular emphasis on the continuous problem of
making the law "an expression of developing ideas of right rather
than a petrifying formulation of quondam beliefs". 113 A typical
restatement of this insight into the authoritative component of law
was made by Yntema in 193 1:
It is the faith of empirical legal science that ideals of justice not
related to human needs are not true ideals; that justice itself is not
an ineffable effervescence of a logical void, but an outflow of
specific human relations, of particular human emotions, and of
life, and so to be known. 1
14
Since the scope of their jurisprudential endeavors did not extend
to the realms of the political process, the concept of control implicit
in the work of Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema was necessarily a
restricted one. In effect, their application of the concept was
confined to a discussion of the degree to which legal rules may be
said to control judicial decision-making. Swimming with the tide of
realism which emphasized the often gross disparity between "the
law in the books" and "the law in action", Oliphant and Yntema
(and, to a lesser extent, Cook) gave the limelight to those situations
where authoritative rules and principles of law clearly did not
control decision-making. In Yntema's view, for example,
The ideal of a government of laws and not of men is a dream
which will have to wait for the time when law becomes calculus
to be realized. Still less can it be said that the administration of
justice is controlled by general principles. The history of codes
and of legislation, or even of language, should have taught us
long since that rules and principles are empty symbols which take
on significance only to the extent that they are informed with the
social and professional traditions of a particular time and
place. 115
Naturally, such a view was deceptively simplistic being based
almost exclusively on the extraordinary cases which arouse the
interest of academics and law review editors. 116 As Cook himself
113. Discussed in Oliphant, Current Discussions of Legal Methodology (1921), 7
A.B.A.J. 241. Also discussed in Cook, Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of
Law (1918-19), 28 Yale L.J. 721 at 728
114. Yntema, supra, note 64 at 955
115. Yntema, supra, note 66 at 479-80
116. See Yntema's later statement in American Legal Realism in Retrospect,
supra, note 23 at 327-28
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pointed out, "settled legal principles" may clearly be said to exert a
controlling influence upon judicial decision-making in the run-of-
the-mill case where no real issue of policy is raised:
The question has to do with the degree of difference between the
state of facts before the court and states of fact passed upon in
previous decisions. If this difference be sufficiently great, the
case cannot fairly be regarded as covered by the previous cases.
If on the other hand the difference is sufficiently small, so that no
reason of policy can fairly be said to exist for differentiating the
present situation from those previously passed on, we may fairly
regard the case in hand as governed by "settled legal principles".
The chief practical difference is that, in the one case the court has
for the first time to pass upon the policy of a decision one way or
the other, while in the other it has previous determinations as to
the policy to rely on. Inasmuch, however, as the court may in any
case refuse to follow the past adjudications, ultimately the
function of the court in both cases is the same. 117
However, as can be gathered from the above passage, Cook was
swift to point out that rules cannot control decisions in a mechanical
way - even in the run-of-the-mill case. The judges may decide to
reverse the policy enshrined in the previous applications of the rules
concerned and, in this sense, the rules are controlling only to a
strictly limited degree. The specific contribution of Cook, Oliphant,
Yntema, and the realist movement in general was to highlight, on
the one hand, the need for conscious articulation of judicial policy
- a process which would clearly indicate the true function of legal
rules - and, on the other hand, the need for judges to sustain the
authority of the law by ensuring that their own notions of policy
accord with community expectations about decision outcomes.
VII. The Relationship Between Law and the Social Process
Our law and, in some measure, our lives are regulated by persons
who do not and cannot know what is going on. We have been
surfeited with speciously brilliant legal theories, whose relation
to the needs of life nobody knows. 118
A constantly recurring theme in the works of Cook, Oliphant, and
Yntema is the need for empirical observation of the law in action. "19
117. Supra, note 80 at 796n.
118. Yntema, The Implications of Legal Science, supra, note 23 at 308
119. See, e.g., Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, supra, note 8 at 308:
. . . . the worth or value of a given rule of law can be determined only by
finding out how it works, that is, by ascertaining, so far as that can be done,
whether it promotes or retards the attainment of desired ends.
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One context within which this theme appeared was the Columbia
debate on legal education during the 1920s in which all three
scholars played a not insignificant role. Oliphant in particular was
adamant in his demand that the whole structure of legal education be
replaced with a radical alternative. One of the critical phases in the
educational framework he proposed was
The acquisition of a background for the study of law, consisting
of an understanding of the structure and functioning of modem
society, an appreciation of the devices and processes of all forms
of social control in contemporary society, and an orienting
knowledge of the agencies and processes of law, viewed as but
one form of social control. '
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In Oliphant's view, therefore, the modem lawyer must be equipped
with at least a basic understanding both of society as a complex
interrelation of processes and of the function of the legal system
within the total social fabric. This was a view which Cook and
Yntema appeared to have shared.
A second context within which the theme appeared prominently
was the jurisprudential debate concerning the nature and purpose of
the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law. One of the functions envisaged
for this "community of scholars" was the creation of an oasis of
reliable information in the "Sahara of ignorance" enveloping the
relationship between law and the social process. Oliphant and
Yntema severely deprecated the vain reliance of traditional
jurisprudence upon "common sense" knowledge and they stressed
that true understanding of the social process could be attained only
by means of systematic empirical study.' 21 The nature of the
inquiry which the Institute would undertake was outlined by Cook:
... . in a school of the kind we are considering there would be
carried on studies in the actual operation of our law. This would
See also, e.g., Yntema, The Purview of Research in the Administration of Justice,
supra, note 22 at 348:
. . . . the present central purpose of research in the administration of justice is
the description of the actual operation of law, both substantive and procedural,
on an observational basis widely representative of varied times and places, and
the accumulation and classification of the items necessary to this end.
120. Oliphant, ed., Summary of Studies in Legal Education, supra, note 3 at 61
12 1. Oliphant, supra, note 93 at 2 1:
We do not know social reality merely because we live in it. The experience of
any man, however broad is limited to one time. It is usually limited to one
people, to one class and even to one occupation.
See also Yntema, The Implications of Legal Science, supra, note 23 at 308-309
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involve research into the conflicts of interest which arise in the
community and into the adjustments of these which we seek to
bring about by legal means. In this connection would be made
studies in legal history, and comparative law, so that we may take
advantage of the experience of other times and other peoples in
solving similar problems. Here also would be required the study
of present day social, economic, and political relations affected
by particular bodies of law. The co-operation of students in the
other social sciences would be needed .... 122
The Faculty of the Institute did in fact prepare the type of
programme envisaged by Cook in the passage above; indeed, the
blueprint prepared for the Institute made ample provision for a
genuinely systematic and rigorous examination of the complex
relationship between law and the social process. Tragically, the
concrete achievements of the Institute were woefully slight,
consisting mainly of a rudimentary collection of statistics rather
than a critical investigation of the nature and function of law in
society. One of the more sympathetic critics of the Institute
summarized its work in the following manner:
Because the initial research was an attempt to study facts about
the complicated and far-flung machinery of three states, little or
no attention was paid to the problem of determining the
usefulness of individual legal devices in solving specific social
problems. This type of research was clearly within the
contemplation of the founders, and this stage of the development
of legal science might have been reached had the Institute gone
on with its work. Unfortunately, the pre-occupation with mass
statistics prevented pertinent research of this nature. Masses of
facts are important only in light of social problems to which they
are related. Since the Institute never reached the stage of isolating
particular social problems, the masses of facts collected are
informative but not particularly significant. It might be said that
the scientific work of the Institute reached approximately the
same stage as botany would, had its efforts been devoted wholly
to counting leaves on trees. 123
One of the most curious paradoxes in the history of American
legal realism is the contrast between the voluminous writings of
Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema upon the subject of scientific theory
and method, on the one hand, and the almost complete absence of
any reference to social, political, or economic theory in such
122. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, supra, note 8 at 309
123. F. K. Beutel, Some Potentialities of Experimental Jurisprudence as a New
Branch of Social Science (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1957) at 112
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writings, on the other. Not a single member of the august trio
deigned to establish even the most rudimentary conceptual
framework capable of ordering empirical information into a
meaningful form. Similarly, none of the three scholars developed
any general theory capable of generating hypotheses susceptible to
empirical testing; instead, Cook retreated into the cloistered calm of
analytical jurisprudence and Oliphant and Yntema lent their efforts
to a mindless amassing of statistics without reference to any guiding
theory whatsoever.
The only trace of general theory in their work is an apparent
acceptance of William Ogbum's theory of "cultural lag". 124 In
1931, Yntema explicitly relied on this theory in his discussion of the
potential avenues for research into the administration of justice. 125
Yntema contended that the major change in material culture during
the preceding century of American history had been the advent of
breathtaking technological progress which had brought in its
ubiquitous train the phenomenon known to modem societies as
specialization. In Yntema's view, such significant developments in
material culture had far outstripped developments in other facets of
American culture such as law. The cultural lag which inevitably
ensued precipitated a major social crisis precisely because the law
was geared to cope only with the problems of an uncomplicated
society long since swept away by the march of technological
change. Yntema's conclusion was that it must be the responsibility
of the practitioner of modem jurisprudence to ensure that the
prescriptions of the law are adjusted to meet the demands of change
in the realms of material culture. Therefore, one of the major
functions of research institutions, such as the Johns Hopkins
Institute, was to furnish the information necessary for this task of
adjustments:
It may be premised, as a basis for research in this field, that a
system of institutions and of ideas such as was presumably quite
124. Ogbum first stated his theory in 1923. For a comprehensive account,
however, see Ogburn, Social Change (New York: Viking Press, 1933) at 73 and
196:
.... Material culture accumulates. The use of bronze is added to the use of
stone. The use of bronze is added to the use of copper and the use of iron is
added to the use of bronze. So that the stream of material culture grows bigger
.... These material culture changes force changes in other parts of culture
such as social organization and customs, but these latter parts of culture do not
change as quickly. They lag behind the material culture changes . . ..
125. Yntema, supra, note 22
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appropriate to medieval England or pioneer America, both
relatively agricultural communities, might well prove insuffi-
ciently adapted to contemporary needs. The present public
concern in the administration of justice suggests that neither
legislation nor precedent have themselves yet sufficiently bridged
this social evolution. And it may further be premised, again as a
basis for research in this field, that legislation and precedent have
not done so, primarily because there has not been available a
sufficient and accurate body of information pointed so as to
furnish the directives, and consequently they have had to remain
too general in attitude and technique, too little and too
inappropriately specialized for the specialization of modern life.
In these phenomena of specialization the crux of this aspect of
law seems to lie; from it springs the opportunity and the
responsibility of legal research to provide information as to the
specialized conditions of justice in changing times. 1
26
Unfortunately, Yntema did not develop this approach any further.
At most, the cultural lag theory can only stand as but part of a
general theory of social change and it is significant that such a
theory was absent from the works of all the American legal realists.
Even within the confines of the cultural lag theory itself, one would
have expected Yntema to have examined the impact of specializa-
tion on particular bodies of law; inexplicably, he completely failed
to pursue this line of inquiry.
It is indeed mystifying to ponder the lamentable failure of Cook,
Oliphant, and Yntema in the tracing of the relationship between law
and the social process. Together, they wrote more on the need for
scientific theory than the other realists yet, unlike Underhill Moore,
no attempt was made to survey the effects of law upon behavior or
the relationship between social behavior and legal development;
unlike Karl Llewellyn, no attempt was made to develop a theory
about the functions of law in society; and unlike Thurman Arnold,
no attempt was made to discuss the role of law in the process of
social change. For a group of scholars whose leit-motiv was a
refrain calling for detailed examination of the law in operation, the
paucity of concrete results is most strange.
(to be continued)
126. Id. at 340-41. A similar analysis appears to underlie Oliphant's A Return to
Stare Decisis, supra, note 33
